

# A Game Theoretic Approach for Securing AODV in Emergency Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

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# Roadmap

- PEACE project & eMANETs
- Emerging Game
- AODV-Game Theoretic (AODV-GT) module
- Mission Critical Mobility
- Performance Evaluation
- Conclusions

# PEACE project & eMANETs


- ICT EU FP7 Project (<http://www.ict-peace.eu/>)
- Disaster Recovery Teams
- Secure Mobile Ad hoc Communications




# Definition of the game

- Two-player non-cooperative **security** games
- **Players:** MANET, malicious nodes
- MANET **defends** against blackhole nodes by using **Host Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDSs)**
- Blackhole nodes succeed to **attract** the data traffic and **drop packets**

# Example



# Example



# Strategy space

- MANET:
  - $d_i$ : the MANET defends a route  $i$
  - $d_{-i}$ : the MANET defends any other route  $-i$ .
- Any blackhole node:
  - $m_i$ : the blackhole node attacks a route  $i$
  - $m_0$ : the blackhole node does not attack MANET
  - $m_h$ : the blackhole node attacks a route  $h$ .

# MANET payoff matrix

$U(t)$

$PD(t)$ : the utility of the MANET at time  $t$

$DC_i$  : the cost per hop of defending a route  $i$

$FC_i$  : the cost per hop of failing to protect a route  $i$

s.t.	$m_i$	$m_0$	$m_h$
$d_i$	$PD(t) - DC_i$	$PD(t) - DC_i$	$PD(t) - DC_i - FC_h$ , for $h \neq i$
$d_{-i}$	$PD(t) - DC_{-i} - FC_i$	$PD(t) - DC_{-i}$	$PD(t) - DC_{-i} - FC_h$ for $h \neq i, -i$

$$DC_i = \frac{\sum_{j \in i} nn_j}{n_i} \quad FC_i = \frac{\sum_{j \in i} dens_j}{n_i} \quad dens_j(R) = \frac{NR_j^2\pi}{A}$$

$nn_j$  : the number of one-hop neighbors of node  $j$

$i$  : a node that belongs to the route  $i$

$n_i$  : the number of nodes constitute the route  $i$

- $N$  : the number of nodes within the transmission range of a node  $j$
- $R_j$  : the transmission range
- $A$  : the area of the MANET

# Attacker payoff matrix

s.t.	$m_i$	$m_0$	$m_h$
$d_i$	$PA(t) - CA_i$	0	$PA(t) - CA_h$ , for $h \neq i$
$d_{-i}$	$PA(t) - CA_i$	0	$PA(t) - CA_h$ , for $h \neq i$

$CA_i$  : is the cost of attacking a route  $i$   
 $PA(t)$  : is the profit of each successful attack at time  $t$

# Nash Equilibrium

- at NE: MANET defends the route with the highest  $P(t) - DC_i$  value
- $\max P(t) - DC_i \rightarrow \min DC_i$
- any blackhole node prefers to attack the MANET instead of receiving zero utility

The strategy pair  $(d_1, m_1)$  is the NE of the game because is the dominant strategy of the non-zero sum game

# AODV-Game Theoretic

- AODV is a **reactive** routing protocol for MANETs
- AODV-GT modifies/ extends the AODV to select routes in a way that the NE of the aforementioned game is achieved
- extension of AODV to carry the **utility value**  $u_A = \frac{1}{nn_A}$  of each node A  
 $nn_A \longrightarrow$  the number of one-hop neighbors of node A

# AODV-Game Theoretic


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 $nn_A \longrightarrow$  the number of one-hop neighbors of node A
- each node which receives a RReq **adds** the utility value to the packet
- source derives the average utility value of each route as

$$\bar{u}_i = \frac{nhops_i + 1}{\sum_{j \in i} nn_j} \quad nhops_i : \text{number of hops in route } i$$

# AODV-Game Theoretic (2)

- source chooses the route with the maximum average utility
- Why ???
  - At NE:  $\min DC_i \longrightarrow \max \bar{u}_i$   $DC_i = \frac{\sum_{j \in i} n n_j}{n_i}$
  - This route is the most secure and cost effective route in terms of HIDS sensors resource consumption
  - Why most secure ???
    - The attacker prefers probabilistically to place himself in an area where the nodes' density is high
      - $\min DC_i$  happens when the density of the chosen route's nodes is low
  - Why cost effective in terms of HIDS resource consumption ???
    - At the NE less HIDSs participate in the intrusion detection

# Mission Critical Mobility




- simulates the movement of nodes during an emergency case in presence of obstacles (extension to network simulator ns-2)


# Simulation Results (1)

UDP traffic, 1000m x 1000m

$v = 1 \text{ m/s}$




$v = 5 \text{ m/s}$




# Simulation Results (2)

TCP traffic, 1000m x 1000m

$v = 1 \text{ m/s}$



$v = 5 \text{ m/s}$



# Conclusions

- AODV-GT is an extension to AODV
- Requires the existence of HIDS
- Minimizes the consumption of HIDSs' resources
- Mitigates the harm of legitimate MANET nodes in presence of blackhole nodes

# Thank you!

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